Abstract: Biometric-based authentication systems offer undeniable benefits to users. However, biometric features are vulnerable to attacks, especially those happening over transmission network or at the stored biometric templates. In this work, we propose a novel biometric-based remote authentication framework to deal with malicious attacks over the transmission channel and at the untrusted server. More concretely, the proposed framework is not only resistant against attacks on the network but also protects biometric templates stored in the untrusted server's database, thanks to the combination of fuzzy commitment protocol and non-invertible transformation techniques. The notable feature as compared to previous biometric based remote authentication framework is its ability to defend the sensitive data against different kinds of insider attacks. The server's administrator is incapable of utilizing information saved in its database to impersonate the clients and deceive the whole system because secure computing in the server is guaranteed by employing a secure coprocessor embedded in the server. In addition, the system performance is maintained with the support of random orthonormal project, which reduces computational complexity while preserving its accuracy.
Introduction
In a modern world, services for people's daily needs are being digitalised. E-commerce happens everywhere, in every aspect of life. As e-commerce is being used as widely as of today, an essential need for its long survival, beside quality, is security. The first security method to be mentioned is authentication. A traditional authentication method that most e-commerce providers are using is username/password. However, this method is revealing its natural setbacks. A password cannot differentiate a legal user from an imposter who is somehow able to access to the user's password. Besides, the more complicated -more secured a password is, the harder it is for users to remember. That is to say, a 'true' password is difficult for people to remember but easy for computer to figure out. Especially, with recent technology development, computer ability is being enhanced, meaning password cracking chance is rising too. For that reason, biometric based authentication method was born, and with its advantages, this method is gradually replacing its predecessor. The first advantage is that biometric (such as face, voice, iris, fingerprint, palm-print, gait, signature,…) reflects a specific individual which helps preventing multi-user usage from one account [1] . Moreover, using a biometric method is more convenient for users since they do not have to remember or carry anything.
However, advantages are accompanied with challenges. Usage of method related to biometric requires technology to eliminate interferences happening when sensors process biometric features. Besides, concerns of security and privacy, especially in remote architecture, are also put on table. The fact that human has a limited number of biometric traits makes users cannot change their biometric over and over like password once it is compromised [2] . Moreover, some sensitive information could be revealed if biometric templates are stored directly in database server without protecting by strong security techniques. In this case, the user's privacy could be violated as the attackers can track their activities by means of cross-matching whenever a user employs the same biometrics across different applications. In other words, the user's biometric template can be used for other purposes than the intended ones. For example, hackers can steal a fingerprint template in bank's database, then use it to look for the criminal records or cross-link to person's health records. A more challenging situation occurs if an attacker has ability to reconstruct actual biometric images from stolen digital templates. In conclusion, the authenticating servers should not be trustworthy to process a user's plaint biometric, and the level of trust of these servers should be discussed more. Last but not least, the network security is also the important component in biometric based remote authentication scheme. When the authentication process is carried out over an insecure network, anyone with their curiosity can approach the biometric information transmitted [3, 4] .
Authentication over insecure public networks or with untrusted servers raises more concerns in privacy and security. The first concern is related to the security of the plain biometric templates which cannot be replaced once compromised. The second is how to prevent the server itself from taking advantage our registered data to impersonate ourselves. Therefore, the goal of this study is to present an effective approach for preserving privacy in biometricbased remote authentication systems. Concretely, biometric templates stored in a database is protected against the leakage of private information while preserving the revocability property. Besides preventing the outside attacks, our proposed protocol is also resistant to the attacks from inside, i.e. the authenticating server.
The remaining parts of this paper are organised as follows. In section 2, related work is briefly reviewed to show what have been done and their limitations. From that point, we present our motivation to fill the gap. In section 3, we introduce crucial related techniques about biometric template protection. Section 4 discusses the approach for the secure computation problem. In the next section, our proposed protocol is described in detail. In section 6, experimental results with different datasets will be shown to evaluate the false accepts/rejects as well as equal error rates. In section 7, the security and efficiency analysis is presented to complementarily demonstrate for the practical value of our newly introduced proposal. Finally, concluding remarks and future work are presented in section 8. about security in remote authentication was that a user identifies himself to a system by sending his secret password. In 1981, Lamport [5] was one of the pioneers who implemented this method. However, the users' passwords stored into the server's database is the weakness of this approach. The fact that these passwords not only could be easily compromised by an outside attacker or even a database administrator, but also were guessed without any difficulties leads to an unsecure authentication process. In 1985, Shamir [6] proposed the idea of using smart card issued by a key generation centre (trusted third party) instead of generating and storing a private key or a password in a server's database. However, this kind of authenticating scheme is just ideal for closed group of users. In 2004, Das et al. [7] introduced a password-based authentication scheme with a dynamic user's identity. In this scheme, the function of a user's identity seemed to be eliminated because its value was changed for each login. For this reason the scheme was vulnerable to the guessing password attacks, the insider attacks,… In 2006, Yoon [8] proposed a security improvement on remote authentication using smart cards. Unlike the previous system, the authentication phase returned two keys for authentication and password encryption, respectively. Moreover, Yoon included timestamp into transmitted messages to against the replay attack. The major shortcomings of their proposal was the lack of the agreement of the session key between client and server in case the authentication was successful. In 2011, Sandeep et al. [9] proposed a similar protocol with the random nonce value embedded in the user's key. This enhancement made users' keys self-modify every time users requested, and reduced the possibility of insider attacks. However, this design unintentionally gave a chance for attackers to impersonate the server and its users. In summary, most of password-based authentication systems were stuck on the same security problems about how to protect users' passwords from inside and outside attacks, how to share the session keys,… Biometric recognition systems which use sensors to capture user's biometric features for authentication have been gradually replacing password-based systems for their convenience. In early stage of development, conventional biometric systems stored biometric templates directly in the database. Therefore, the templates could be easily abused by attackers outside or even the administrator who had the privileges to control all the data in the server. Privacy violations were unavoidable in such systems. Users' activities could be tracked, some sensitive information could be leaked, or even attackers could impersonate the legitimate owner of the biometric template during the authentication process. Over the years, there have been plenty of works which research on preserving privacy in biometric-based authentication systems. Biometric template protection is one of indispensable part to this research field. In [10] , Jain et al. presented a detailed survey of various biometric template protection schemes (as illustrated in Fig. 1 ) and discussed their strengths and weaknesses in light of the security and accuracy dilemma. There are two approaches to deal with this issue, including feature transformation and biometric cryptosystem. The first approach identified as cancellable biometrics allows users to replace a compromised biometric template while reducing the amount of information revealed. In this approach, biometric templates are transformed using a function defined by a user-specific factor such as a key, a password, or a random string… The goal of this approach is to provide diversity and unlinkability by using different transforming functions for different applications involving the same set of users. Another advantage of this approach is the ability to guarantee the revocability, when a user can revoke his/her compromised template and replace it with a new one without having to change the biometric data. However, some methods of this approach cannot achieve an acceptable performance while others are unrealistic under assumptions from a practical viewpoint [3] , and the major drawback of this approach is the security level is lower than that of the other. The second approach combines the biometrics and cryptography technique in order to take advantages of both. The previous schemes employing these methods aim at generating a key, which is derived from the biometric template or bound with the biometric template, and some helper data. Both the biometric template and the key are then discarded, only the helper data is stored in the database for reproducing the biometric or the secret key later. Nevertheless, the biometric cryptosystem seem to lose the revocability property. On this account, some recent studies tend to integrate the advantages of both approaches to enhance not only the security but also the performance of the system. Hybrid approach is the combination two or more methods to create a single template protection scheme. Very recently, in 2018, the combination of secure sketch and ANN (Artificial Neural Network) was proposed [11] . The ANN with high noisy tolerance capacity can not only enhance the recognition by learning the distinct features, but also assure the revocable and non-invertible properties for the transformed template. In addition, the secure sketch's construction can reduce the false rejection rate significantly due to its error correction ability. The fuzzy vault was combined with periodic function based transformation in [12] , or with the non-invertible transformation to conduct a secure online authentication in [13] . The homomorphic cryptosystem was employed in fuzzy commitment scheme to achieve the blind authentication in [14] . Another combination approach was introduced in [15] . In this work, we are going to integrate the idea of fuzzy commitment and the non-invertible transformation to guarantee the security for user's biometric template.
In recent years, many biometric-based remote authentication protocols have been proposed. However, most previous protocols only protect the client side and the transmission channel, neglecting the server side. In [16] , the authors utilises Biometric Encryption Key (BEK) to encrypt Private Key and safeguard Private Key. The BioPKI system proposed in the paper turned around the security of private key, and eliminated the biometric feature out of security aspects.
In 2011, Kai Xi et al. [17] proposed a bio-cryptographic security protocol for remote authentication in mobile computing environment. In this protocol, fingerprint was used for verification, and the genuine points were protected by the fuzzy vault technique which randomly inserts a great number of chaff points into the set of genuine points. All elements in the newly created set were given index numbers. However, the authors focused only on the security of the client side (mobile devices) and the transmission channel. The server was supposed to have higher security strength, so the authors did not care about the attacks on the server or even the attacks from the server. In addition, the authors argued that to prevent replay attack and brute force attack, a biometric-based session key was generated separately from the set of a genuine points; nonetheless, the server only had the list of index numbers of these points so it was unable to generate the key independently as described in [17] .
In 2013, Hisham et al. [18] presented another approach that combined steganography and biometric cryptosystem in order to obtain the secure mutual authentication and key exchange between client and server in remote architecture. In this paper, the authors provided some references for proving that hiding biometric data in a cover image based on steganography technique can increase the security of transferring biometric data between unsecure networks [19] . Moreover, in order to protect biometric template stored in the authentication server while preserving the revocability property, the protocol employed the invertible transformation technique using random orthonormal matrices to project biometric feature vectors into other spaces while preserving the original distances. The new approach obtained not only the secure mutual authentication but also the immunity from replay and other remote attacks. However, the authors have not considered the ability that the authentication server itself stoles the data in its own database to impersonate its users in order to conduct the illegal transactions. In summary, almost current researches only focus on biometric template protection or how to defend against the attack from outside; they have not spent enough concerns for the attacks from inside yet. More concretely speaking, the ability that the server accesses into the system on behalf of a user and carries out some criminal actions should be taken into account.
In addition, the scalability property needs to be discussed more in the remote authentication architecture. When the number of users and servers is growing, the number of templates which belongs to a user could be large, and each server has to manage every user's template. That design makes the system resourceconsuming and vulnerable to different types of attacks. To guarantee the scalability properties, Fengling et al. presented a biometric-based remote authentication which employed the Kerberos protocol [20] . A biometric-Kerberos authentication protocol was suitable for e-commerce applications. The benefit of Kerberos is that expensive session-based user authentication can be separated from cheaper ticket-based resource access. However, the Achilles' heel of the proposed scheme is Key Distributed Center (KDC) -authentication server which is supposed to be trusted. Therefore, there were no techniques protecting the private information of client against the insider attacks.
In 2010 study, Maneesh et al. [3] introduced a new concept in biometric-based authentication system -Blind authentication. This framework was blind in the sense that it revealed only user's identity, and no additional information about the user or his biometric data were disclosed to authentication server or viceversa. To guarantee this requirement in a remote authentication, users traditionally encrypted his authentication data before sending it to a server. Then, the server was required to carry out all the computations in the encrypted domain including comparing two encrypted data. However, biometric data is considered as a noisy data, hence, it seems extremely hard for the server to recognise two similar biometric data in its encrypted domain. The authors went through this difficulty by designing the classifier in the plain feature space. All computations required for authentication were done by this trained classifier, completely in the encrypted domain. However, the users and the server treated the classifier as a trust third party. All users provided the multiple samples of their plaint biometric templates for the classifier. And the server had no doubts at all about the classifier parameters sent from the classifier. There was nothing to ensure that the classifier was resistant against some attacks.
ESketch [14] was another biometric-based remote authentication using homomorphic cryptosystem for protecting a user's privacy from an untrusted server. In this scheme, owing to homomorphic property, the server only verified whether the biometric template provided by the user was contained within the list of registered users without that the particular identity of the user accessing the system was revealed. In other words, thanks to the homomorphic cryptosystem, the server could determine whether the biometric template provided by a user existing in its database without having to release the user's biometric data or those that were stored in the database. User's original biometric data is firstly secured via the fuzzy commitment technique.
However, to ensure the security requirement, the client had to participate in part of the calculation process. The calculation amount at the server side, and even at the client side was enormous, especially when the number of users surges. This was one of the setbacks of the system. Additionally, there was another weakness related to the system's security. Even though the server sacrificed its resources to protect user's biometric data from the curiosity of outside attackers and especially inside attackers from the server itself during registration process, every user had already provided his/her original biometric data to the server. That is to say, the security expectation for this system has not been complete.
In another study of 2015 [21] , the authors utilised the Chebyshev polynomial to secure privacy for remote multi-factor authentication based biometric. The Chebyshev polynomial owned some chaotic properties which were suitable for designing a cryptographic system. Specifically, the semi-group property of enhanced Chebyshev was eligible for implementing a trapdoor mechanism. Therefore, the authors applied this property to present an anonymous authentication protocol. Moreover, the fuzzy extractor and secure sketch were integrated in the proposed protocol not only to extract the authenticating key from user's biometric data but also to protect the biometric template from outside attacks. The proposed protocol achieved session key agreement, and got higher security and less computation cost in comparison with the previous proposal [22] . However, the security analysis of this work only focused on how the proposed protocol overcame the drawback of the previous one. If attackers got the ability to take administrative privileges or the administrator became corrupted, the users were absolutely impersonated. Frankly, this proposal could not resist the inside attacks.
The topic of security in remote authentication using biometric features has recently focused on how to prevent attacked from within. Beside incorporating different biometric template protection techniques, the latest works mainly introduce some protocols that limit the administrator's power over authentication data, to avoid cases when the administrator steal user's data stored in the database to impersonate him/her. Recent researches from group of authors Nguyen et al. [23, 24] proposed dividing main server to two or more supporting servers specialising in different functions. These servers stored parts of user's authentication information. To ensure the authentication process was complete, these servers had to participate. This limited their influence on user's sensitive data. Nevertheless, the security was not thorough since if these servers colluded with each other; information leakage is always possible. In summary, separating servers did reduce chances of inside attacks. Table 1 presents a summary of related works in remote authentication protocol based biometric. It highlights the main achievements, as well as the main weakness of the previous works. It also provides some attributes such as biometric template protection, cancellable property, level of security, mutual authentication to get the thoughtful comparison on these protocols. In brief, the main unsolved security issue in remote authentication system is to prevent the attacks from the inside.
The crucial contribution of this work is that we propose a generalised secure coprocessor-based protocol for preserving privacy in biometric-based remote authentication system which has the ability not only to protect biometric data of clients but also to prevent an authentication server from impersonating its clients. Concretely speaking, the proposal is resistant to the outside attacks from an insecure network by combining the orthonormal random project with the fuzzy commitment scheme. Moreover, the secure coprocessor is embedded in the server to guarantee the secure computing which is very important to prevent inside attacks. The mutual authentication and the key agreement are also guaranteed in this work.
Biometric template protection

Fuzzy commitment scheme and error correcting code
Fuzzy commitment scheme as proposed in [25] belongs to the first class of biometric cryptosystem approach. It is the combination two popular techniques in the areas of Error Correcting Codes (ECC) and cryptography. To understand how fuzzy commitment scheme works, we have to learn about ECC. Formally speaking, ECC plays a central role in the fuzzy commitment scheme. The purpose of ECC is transmitting a message through the noisy channel which can possibly corrupt the original message. ECC checks and corrects the corrupted messages if they contains a certain number of errors which this ECC can afford to check. An ECC is also illustrated in Fig. 2 .
An ECC contains a set of codewords ∁ ⊆ {0, 1} n , and the pair of Encoder -Decoder components. Given the message space ℳ = {0, 1} k (k < n), the Encoder component owns the translation function (or encoding function) g: ℳ → ∁, this function maps a message to a codeword before it is transmitted along a noisy channel. The Decoder component contains the decoding function f : {0, 1} n → ℳ. Note that g is a map from ℳ to ∁; however, f is not the inverse map from ∁ to ℳ but a map from arbitrary n-bit strings to the nearest codeword in ∁. If f can correct up to t bit errors, we say f has a correction capability of t.
In fuzzy commitment scheme, a biometric data is treated as a corrupted codeword. During registration stage, a client provides biometric template B to server. Server randomly picks a codeword c then calculates δ = B ⊕ c, and the hash version of codeword c. Next, server stores the pair of δ, Hash(c) into the database. During authentication stage, a new biometric with noise B′ is sent to server by the client. From its side, server calculates c′ = B′ ⊕ δ, proceeds decoding c′, then compares hash version of the result with Hash(c) previously stored in the database. If the two are matched, client is authenticated. This process is demonstrated in Fig. 3 .
Depending on the applied ECC, there are many variations of the fuzzy commitment. Through researches about fuzzy commitment, the Linear Error Correcting Code (LECC) has been widely used.
The LECC is applied to the authentication system using faces or any biometric features which can be represented in vector form. Let take a look at the example below.
The set of codewords ∁ = {100u, 100v} (u, v are random integer numbers) is defined. Assume the registered biometric feature is B = (745, 260) . We choose the pair (u, v) = (3, 3), thus the responding code word is c = (300, 300). The helper data δ is calculated by the formula B = c + δ; then δ = (445, − 40). In the authentication phase, the provided biometric feature is B′ = (720, 240). The server uses the helper data δ to calculate the corrupted codeword c′ = B′ − δ = (275, 280). Here is the process which the Decoder has to do to transfer the corrupted codeword c′ to the selected codeword c.
The codeword c has a form (100u, 100v) (u, v ∈ ℕ), so we have the constraints (1) and (2)
If we choose the authentication threshold t = 0.25, the pair (u, v) = (3, 3) is calculated. Then the codeword c is recovered. If the threshold t is smaller, the decode process could not recover the original codeword, then the authentication could fail.
Random orthonormal projection
Random Orthonormal Projection (ROP) is a technique that utilises an orthonormal matrix to project a set of points into other spaces while preserving the distances between points. In the categorisation of template protection schemes proposed by Jain [10] , ROP belongs to the non-invertible transformation approach. The revocability requirement is satisfied by mapping a biometric feature into a secure domain through an orthonormal matrix (ℱ) (as illustrated in Fig. 4) . The well-known method to generate an orthonormal matrix is Gram-Schmidt process. The inputs of this process is a set of linearly independent vectors v 1 , v 2 , v 3 , …, v n . However, GramSchmidt process requires complex calculations, quite apart from the fact that the set of input vectors is randomly generated, the linearly independent property is not always guaranteed. In summary, generating an orthonormal matrix of size n × n from Gram-Schmidt process may be a critical problem when applied on constraint computationally devices like PDA and handheld devices.
Another method to effectively deliver orthonormal matrix was introduced in [26] . It can be used to replace traditional method of Gram-Schmidt. Given the biometric feature vector x of size 2n, orthonormal random matrix A of size 2n × 2n, random vector b of size 2n, we have the transformation y = Ax + b.
The simple matrix of size 2 × 2 is considered in the formula (3). This matrix is orthonormal for any value of θ
The orthonormal matrix A of size 2n × 2n owns a diagonal which is a set of n orthonormal matrices of size 2 × 2. The other entries of A are zeros. We present the example of matrix A of size 2n × 2n as shown in the formula (4) where the values θ 1 , θ 2 , …, θ n are the random numbers in the range 0: 2π
By using this technique to produce the orthonormal matrix, there is no need for a complex process such as Gram-Schmidt. Beside its effectiveness in computational complexity, it can also improve the security while guaranteeing intra-class variation. When client is in doubt of his template getting exposed, he only needs to create another orthonormal matrix A to gain a new transformed template.
Encrypted computation
The encrypted computation has a potential to solve a variety of problems relevant to data privacy and security, including the data privacy against malicious/untrusted servers [27] [28] [29] . The scenario can be described like that: a user wants to keep his input secret even with the service provider, so he encrypts the inputs and sends them to the service provider. The service provider is able to compute on the encrypted inputs and produce the result in some encrypted form. This output is then sent back to its user for decrypting and getting the actual result. The perfect privacy is no one but the user sees decrypted data or has knowledge of the private key used to encrypt user's data. To achieve this level of privacy, the first well-known approach we have to mention is the homomorphic encryption, and the second one relates to a secure processing unit on server. We will elaborate on these approaches as follows.
Homomorphic encryption
Homomorphic encryption is a form of encryption which is able to perform the computation on ciphertext, thus generating an encrypted result, which, when decrypted, matches the result of the operations carried out on the plaintext. In other hand, it ensures the confidentiality of processed data. This is a crucial reason why the homomorphic property becomes a desirable feature in modern communication systems. It has been applied in many secure system, such as secure cloud computing system [27] , secure internet voting [30] , biometric-based authentication [14] , PIR (Private Information Retrieval),… Fig. 5 illustrates the concept of homomorphic encryption scheme, where m 1 and m 2 represents the input data from clients. Server carries out the computation in the encrypted form and sends the encrypted result to its clients. There are two types of homomorphic cryptosytems. Partially homomorphic cryptosystem includes RSA, ElGamal, Pallier, Goldwasser Micali, Benaloh, …which allow homomorphic computation of a certain operation on ciphertexts (e.g. addition, multiplication, quadratic function, …). For more details, let take a look at RSA cryptosystem. RSA is a multiplicatively homomorphic encryption where the product of two encrypted inputs matches the encryption of the product of two plaint inputs. However, RSA does not have ability to perform on addition operation nor the combination of multiplications and additions. The term of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) was introduced by Rivest, Adle-man and Dertouzos in 1978. FHE allows unlimited chaining of operations on the ciphertext space. However, up till now, it has been unclear whether the fully homomorphic encryption was practical. In summary, as for the security, the homomorphic encryption is quite appropriate to guarantee privacy requirement, however it has a large computational overhead. This limitation makes homomorphic encryption of complex functions impractical. Especially, when the number of users in the system is large, the protocol employing homomorphic encryption to anonymise its users takes a huge time to process the data. Another approach to guarantee the privacy resorts to a secure processing unit located on server.
Secure processing unit on server
To address the concern about the privacy of users' data entrusted to a server, many researchers have mentioned about a trusted third party in their works. In [29] , Dang proposed a protocol ensured all security requirements of outsourcing model resorting to a trusted third party. The use of a trusted third party was to change his model, which was very difficult to address directly, to a better solved model. In this context, the term 'trusted third party' referred to a security protocol which users could count on. However, creating a flawless security protocol for a certain system which demands a high level of security is a long-term process. Nowadays, researchers have directed their attention to the hardware-based trusted third party which is also called a secure processing unit in server [28] . With regarding to technology, IBM has introduced this kind of unit and named it Secure Processor [31] . Secure processors (also called cryptographic processors) are hardware security modules designed to prevent the abuse of data and key material. Their history began with military cipher machines and security modules which encrypted PINs that bank customers used to authenticate themselves to ATMs [32] . Since then, they have been widely used to protect Secure Socket Layer (SSL) key from web servers, to protect proprietary software and algorithm against theft by employees, or to create smart cards, security chips… In e-commerce era, secure processors have enabled more applications by ensuring private and authentic programme execution even in the event of physical attack. Using encryption techniques is essential in modern e-commerce applications. These applications apply encrypted computation in several different ways to ensure data privacy & security and also its integrity [33] [34] [35] . Technically, secure processor is a protected hardware module and is only accessed into the internal state through its I/O interface. This condition allows the module to store sensitive data without the risk of leakage. It is also used as a coprocessor. The term 'coprocessor' is used to refer to the additional processor which provides some advanced functions for the main CPU. The supplementary functions can be referred as graphic, digital signal process, string process, encryption, or design I/O interface for peripheral devices… The main purpose of a coprocessor is to accelerate system performance by reducing the workload of the main general-purpose CPU.
Secure coprocessor is a hardware module containing: a CPU, bootstrap ROM, secure non-volatile memory. This hardware module is physically shielded from penetration, and the I/O interface to the module is the only way to access the internal state of the module. If the shield is broken, a secure coprocessor erases all critical memory. More concretely speaking, an attacker can be able to break into a secure coprocessor and see its structure. Nevertheless, he can not find out its internal state nor modify it except through the normal I/O channels of secure coprocessor.
In fact, many manufacturers have been investing their time and money in research and development of secure crypto-processor. For example, IBM has continuously launched a series of secure coprocessors [31] . The earliest product in IBM cryptographic coprocessor family was the IBM 4758 PCI Cryptographic Coprocessor (PCICC), the next ones were the IBM e-business PCI Cryptographic Accelerator (PCICA), IBM PCI-X Cryptographic Coprocessor (4764/CEX2C/PCIXCC), and IBM PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor (4765/CEX4S/CEX3C) -PCIeCC. The latest was the IBM PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor version 2 (CEX5S).
IBM 4765 PCIe Cryptographic Coprocessor is a programmable processor. It is used in high end security and high speed cryptographic operations on sensitive data which can not be disclosed to an unsafe shared computer. In e-commerce era, it is a notable product which allows e-commercial transactions to perform safely and suitable for several cryptographic applications such as PIN generation and verification, Public Key Infrastructure applications, web-serving applications, smart card application,… Using IBM's Common Cryptography Architecture (CCA) as supporting software program, the processor is able to conduct popular industrial encryption algorithms such as DES, T-DES, SHA, HMAC, RSA, ECC… IBM also provides supporting softwares which are known as API. Depending on which version, these API can be extended or replaced to integrate with cryptographic features or specialised requests from the system. Like others cryptographic coprocessors, the IBM 4765 has protective shields, sensors, and control circuitry to protect against a wide variety of attacks against the system. Moreover, it also owns a unique private/public key pair, which is stored in the device. The public key is certified at the factory by an IBM private key and the certificate is retained in the coprocessor.
In this work, in order to guarantee the data privacy against the curiosity of the server, we use a hypothetic secure processing unit on the server whose functions are similar to those of the secure coprocessors in the series released by IBM. However, the fact that general secure coprocessors are significantly constrained in both computation ability and memory capacity sets the requirement of reducing the computation in the hypothetic secure processing unit to a minimum in our proposal protocol.
Proposal protocol
General architecture
In the rest of the paper, the following notations will be employed:
• B is a biometric feature vector of a client • M is an orthonormal matrix that a client creates.
• B TC is a transformed biometric stored in the database as a template.
• H(m) is the hash version of the message m.
• BL is a biometric lock of a client.
• Pu & Pr are, respectively, the public key and the private key of a cryptosystem.
• E PuX (m) is the encryption of the message m using the public key of X.
• K is the authentication key generated randomly by the client.
• E K (m) is the symmetric encryption of the message m using the secret key K. • S is the secret factor provided by the client in authentication phase.
• S T is the secret factor of the client which is stored in the database.
• C is a client.
• SC is the Secure Processor • CS is the Control Server • PuSC & PrSC are, respectively, the public key and the private key of SC.
The proposal protocol has two phases. The purpose of the enrolment phase is for a client to register the secure version of his/her biometric template to server. The feature vector B T of the biometric template is generated from the client's biometric data. Then, B T is transformed into a secure space by Random Orthonormal Projection technique. The result of this module, B TC , is called the cancellable version of B T . Then, B TC is encrypted by the public key PuSC of a Secure Processor in order to make sure that only this unit can process this kind of data. E PuSC (B TC ) and other additional data are transferred to the database of server through the internet.
In the authentication phase, feature vector B is extracted. Then, B is transformed to B C by the Random Orthonormal Projection module. The cancellable version of B is encoded by the client's key K through the Encode module of Fuzzy Commitment technique. The result of this process is a biometric lock BL, which is sent to server. Once receiving the packet from its client through internet, Control Server opens the packet and sends BL as well as some data stored in database to Secure Processor. Secure Processor decrypts E PuSC (B TC ) by its private key to get B TC . B TC is used to decode the biometric lock BL to reproduce the client's key K in the Decode module of the fuzzy commitment technique. The newly generated K is sent to another module to verify whether it is the client's key or not. If matched, the result will send to Control Server to complete the verification process. At this time, the server can make sure that the client is really the one he/she declared. However, to guarantee the mutual authentication, the server sends back some information from the generated key K to the client. The client has to check this data to make sure that the server he/she has communicated with is the one he/she had registered before. The general architecture of the whole protocol is illustrated in Fig. 6 .
Enrolment phase
In the enrolment phase, the client employs a random number K M stored on the his/her device to generate the random orthonormal matrix M (based on the technique described in section 3.2). After being extracted, the feature vector B T is combined with matrix M to produce the cancellable version B TC of B T . Then B TC is encrypted by the public key of SC. Besides, the client calculates the hash version of the serial number S T , hash(S T ). Then, he sends the packet, including E PuSC (B TC ) and hash(S T ) to server. The process is illustrated in Fig. 7 . If the client is in doubt that his authentication data has been compromised, he can overwrite the data related to his biometric template by replacing the orthonormal matrix M to reproduce the new cancellable biometric template B TC in lieu of replacing his biometric data B. One practical application of our proposal is the face authentication system. The feature vector B T is extracted by a Feature Extractor process from the client's facial image captured from the sensor. In most face authentication systems, the feature vector B T has size of 2n. Therefore, the random orthonormal matrix M has size of 2n × 2n. And the size of the random number K M , which is used to generate the orthonormal matrix M, is n.
Authentication phase
In this phase, we apply the idea of fuzzy commitment scheme to obtain the secure biometric based remote authentication. Instead of transmitting the plain biometric data over the insecure network as the original scheme, client sends a biometric lock (BL) or a helper data to a server. At the server side, a biometric lock is combined with the component Y related to the client's biometric which is stored in database at the enrolment phase. The result of this combination is the authenticated key. The process is presented by Fig. 8 .
We provide Fig. 9 for readers to get overview of the whole authentication phase. The more details are described in Fig. 10 . N A is the number which is generated randomly by server every time client sends a request. It is also called Nonce -Number used once because each number is used only one time to ensure that old communications can not be reused in replay attacks. In our authentication protocol, two nonces are used, N A -issued from server and the other, K (also considered as authentication key) -issued from client. The nonces guarantee that attackers can not reused the old messages from not only server but also client in the authentication process.
At first, client sends a request to server. Server creates a random number N A , then encrypting it by the public key PuC of server, and sending the packet E PuC (N A ) to client. Note that all messages between the client and the server over transmission network are protected by asymmetric cryptosystem (PKI -Public Key Infrastructure). In the mean of time, client calculates the cancellable biometric data B C from biometric feature B′ and creates orthonormal matrix M from K M . It is clear that the biometric feature B in registration phase and the biometric feature B′, extracted in authentication phase, of the same person cannot be identical due to noises. Calculated B C combines with N A to produce another version of transformed biometric -B O . This step is done to ensure every time the client sends his/her request, a different version of B O is created to avoid replay attack. This B O then, together with the authentication key K, puts into the fuzzy commitment process to generate a biometric lock BL (as described in Fig. 10 ). After that, BL is sent to server for authentication purpose in step 3.1. At the same time, client retrieves the mobile serial number S, encrypting it by the authentication K, sending the encrypted S to sever in step 3.2.
At server side, after generating the NONCE N A , server encrypts N A by the public key PuSC of Secure Processor. Note that the applied encryption algorithms in step 4 have to possess the homomorphic property such as RSA, ElGamal, Pallier, Goldwasser-Micali,… [36] . Server retrieves E PuSC (B TC ) from the database, then employs homomorphic encryption to calculate E PuSC (B TO ) (as described in section 4.1). B TO is the one time version of biometric template, and created from the combination Secure Processor is programmed to follow these steps. Once receiving E PuSC (B TO ) from CS, SP uses its private key to get B TO in step 7. B TO and BL are combined to reproduce the authentication key K in step 8. SP, then, uses K to decrypt E K (S) in step 9; then, hashing the result to get hash(S) in the next step. After that, SP performs the comparison between the newly achieved hash(S) in step 10 and the one retrieved from the server's database. If two inputs are matched, it means the biometric data client provided through BL matches with the transformed biometric template B TO stored in the database and the other authentication factor S is also satisfied. The result of the comparison process in step 11 can prove client is authenticated or not. SP, then, passes the positive result to CS through the combination h(S + K) in step 13. The negative result can also be informed to CS through a message. The computation process of SP is done here. We can see all the sensitive data including plain biometric data and the secret factor S has been computed by SP and only the final result is brought out.
Once receiving h(S + K) in step 13, CS transfers it to client for the mutual authentication purpose. The client carries out the comparison between the h(S + K) from server and the one he/she computes. If they are match, the server is authenticated. The client can feel secure about the authentication server which he/she communicated with. Once the mutual authentication is successfully accomplished, K is used to protect the communication between the client and the server.
Experimental result
We apply PCA to extract feature vectors from users' facial images. PCA is trained under the training data set containing 500 images of 225 South East Asians, 80 Middle and West Asians, 120 East Asians, and 80 Europeans.
The accuracy of this hybrid scheme is tested under the database which includes 220 people, each has 20 different facial expressions. The first image of each users is registered to the authentication server, the others are used to be tested. The accuracy of the biometric authentication system is evaluated through these error rates: FAR, FRR, EER.
• FAR, also known as False Acceptance Rate, accepts an entrance when a visitor is invalid. This shows probability of the imposter logging in and succeeding.
• FRR, also known as False Reject Rate, rejects an entrance when a visitor is valid. This shows probability of the visitor logging in & getting rejected • EER, also known as Equal Error Rate, is intersection of FAR & FRR, at which FAR equals FRR.
To determine the best threshold to facial recognition system like our protocol, we need to evaluate each threshold. The value of threshold t is calculated by the formula • FAR: for each user, his/her first image is compared with all images of 219 other users in testing data set. Note that each user has 20 facial images. Therefore, we has 963.600 times of comparisons. If two images in these comparisons are matched, the facial recognition system makes a false accept error. From these results, we obtain the False Accept Rate.
• FRR: for each user, we take turn to compare each and every image of this user to the rest of his/her other 19 images. Therefore, the number of comparisons is 220 × C 2 20 = 41.800. Every comparison which delivers unmatched, the facial recognition system makes a false reject error. From these results, we obtain the False Reject Rate. Figs. 11-13 show the recognition accuracy results in term of FAR and FRR in three cases: no security methods are applied, only the orthonormal matrix is applied, the orthonormal matrix and the fuzzy commitment are applied.
In the first case illustrated in Fig. 11 , the FRR and FAR intersect at the threshold t ≃ 0.22. At this intersection, the error rate is about 7%.
In the second case illustrated in Fig. 12 , the FRR and FAR intersect at the threshold t ≃ 0.28. And at this intersection, the error rate is also about 7%.
In the hybrid scheme, integrating orthonormal matrix and fuzzy commitment, which is demonstrated in Fig. 13 , the intersection of FRR and FAR (also known as EER) all values at 7%. This figure proves the proposed hybrid scheme delivers a positive result with the probability of correct recognition of around 93% (the threshold value also depends on the quantising value; however the result stays the same; in this experimental result, the quantising value stands at 200). The EER value, in none security method case (demonstrated in Fig. 11 ), is also 7% with the threshold value is 0.22. Addition, in case of applying orthonormal matrix to protect biometric template (demonstrated in Fig. 12 ), ERR value is still the same. Hence, it is pertinent that the recognition performance of our hybrid scheme is competitive with the non-template protection ones. In summary, the combination of orthonormal matrix and fuzzy commitment in biometric-based authentication system is absolutely feasible and can be put into practice.
Evaluation
Security analysis
The protocol indicates that the authenticity of the client needs following factors:
• Client's biometric data B • The number used once N A sent from server • The token that holds the number K M to generate the random orthonormal matrix M • The secret factor S.
The multi-factor authentication enhances security since the probability of stealing client's authentication information to enter the system is reduced. In this section, we analyse in detail how the proposal protocol is robust against some main attacks.
Biometric template attack:
In case of not using the public key of secure processor to encrypt the data stored in server's database, the original biometric data still has the protection from the non-invertible transformation technique. Server keeps the transformed version, but it is impossible for server to infer the client's original biometric data from this template. Using orthonormal matrix as a non-invertible function ensures the revocability of biometric template. In case the client is in doubt that his/her biometric template is compromised, he/she only needs to alter parameter K M to produce new orthonormal matrix, then registers the new transformed biometric template to the server. This process is similar to that of changing password in traditional authentication system. To sum up, even when attackers steal the data stored in the database, they can not find out the original biometric data nor use cross-matching attack to track clients' activities because the templates which clients register in each service are not the same.
Replay attack:
Replay attack happens when attackers reuse old information to impersonate either client or server with the aim to deceive the other side. This attack is prevented by using N A and session key K which are used only once. The system only collapses once the attackers steal private key. In that case the attacker is able to obtain the 3rd message in authentication phase (see Fig. 10 ) to calculate BL. After that, the attacker reuses the BL to deceive server in a new session. The proposed protocol is immune from this type of attack as the BL generated every time the clients request contains new N A produced by the server. In the event of attacker using old BL, the authentication process cannot calculate exact authentication key K. More concretely speaking, in authentication phase, the transformed biometric features, B C at client side and B TC at server side, are combined with the same number N A by a simple addition operation. This action creates a one-time version of the transformed biometric feature; therefore, attacker cannot reuse the old transformed biometric feature to delude the server. Thanks to that, the security of the entire protocol is strengthened without scarifying the accuracy. The accuracy is maintained because addition operation does not modify intra-class variation of the biometric features, which results in unchanged distance between transformed biometric feature & its original. In other words, the error rate stabilises while security is strengthened.
Man-in-the-middle attack:
MITM (Man-in-the-middle) attack considers as an active eavesdropping, attackers make an independent connection and replays messages between client and server in order to impersonate one side to delude the other side. Concretely speaking, the communication in this case is controlled by attacker while client or server still believes that they are talking to each other over a private connection. MITM attack happens when the attacker catches the messages between client and server then impersonates one side to communicate with the other side. In our proposed protocol, this type of attack cannot occur since the protocol presents mutual authentication requirement, not only does it requires the server to authenticate its right client but also enables the client to perform its own process to confirm requested server.
Insider attack:
This type of attack happens when the administrator of authentication server exploits client's data stored in the database to legalise his authentication process on behalf of the client. Many previous works [21, 22, 37, 38] have not taken into account this kind of attack, or their solutions have seemed to be impractical for huge computational overhead like [14] . In our previous work [23] , we reduced the risk of insider attack by splitting authentication server into two different servers. Each server had its own function and data. One server possessed transformed biometric template and some supporting information to generate authentication key. Authentication function was carried out by the other server. To perform this function, the second server had to receive authentication key calculated by the first server and authentication information provided by the client. Neither the first nor the second server could take advantages of the stored data to impersonate their clients. However, in case the two servers colluded with each other, they could gather the client's sensitive information they possessed to legalise the access to the system on behalf of the client. Obviously, the previous solution just reduced not removed the risk. In this work, we have applied the encrypted computation field to guarantee data privacy and security against the curiosity of servers. A secure coprocessor is used to perform the operation related to client's sensitive data. All these data stored in the database is encrypted by the public key of the secure coprocessor. Therefore, server can not get to know the client's data nor take advantages of these data to impersonate client. More concretely speaking, though server has all privileges on the stored data, it can not deceive secure processor nor force it to reveal plain biometric date of client or even to produce the rightful authentication key. Every single physical attempt to access the internal state of secure processor causes the erasure of its memory content.
Based on Table 1 , our proposal protocol guarantees all the popular security issues in biometric based remote authentication system such as biometric template protection, cancellable property, mutual authentication,… We also solve the concern about the insider attack, and that makes our security level higher than the previous ones.
Efficiency analysis
Let 2n be the size of the original biometric templates. We need to generate the 2n × 2n orthonormal matrix which is used to transform the original template to a secure domain.
The time complexity of the entire protocol mostly depends on the complexity of the fuzzy commitment process and the random orthonormal projection process. The whole process of the protocol (including enrolment phase and authentication phase) consumes:
• The random orthonormal projection process: two times • The fuzzy commitment process: one time • Some additional operations such as hash, XOR, encrypt and decrypt operation Based on Tables 2 and 3 , the time complexity of the entire protocol is a polynomial time.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented an unsusceptible biometric based remote authentication framework to most of sophisticated attacks over an open network. The proposed protocol combines client's biometric with the other authentication factors to achieve the high level of security. Thanks to the combination of fuzzy commitment and non-invertible transformation technologies as well as a mutual challenge/response, the protocol is resistant to some main attacks to biometric-based authentication system such as biometric template attack, replay attack, man-in-the-middle attack. Moreover, the experimental result shows that the FAR and FRR stand at 7% in both cases with or without the security mechanism. It proves that the recognition performance of our hybrid scheme is competitive with the non-template protection ones. The remarkable contribution of this work is that we have embedded a secure coprocessor into the untrusted server to solve the problem of the inside attacks. We eliminate the ability that the administrator utilises the client's authentication information saved in the database to impersonate him/her and cheat the system. For the limits in computation ability and memory capacity of a secure coprocessor, we have designed the communication between a secure coprocessor and its control server in such a way that it has to execute the minimum computations related to the sensitive data of users, and the control server has to do the rest without taking any advantage of the users' data. By using the random orthonormal project instead of traditional orthonormal project, the computational complexity is reduced while the accuracy is remained. ii. create an orthonormal matrix the orthonormal matrix which is illustrated as the formula (4) needs to execute the sine and cosine functions n times.
assume the time complexity of performing sine function is O(s) and consine function is O(c). Therefore, the complexity of generating an orthonormal matrix is O(nc) + O(ns) = O(2ns) = O(2nc). in our protocol, we choose the 'Arithmetic geometric mean iteration' algorithm to perform sine and cosine function, the time complexity of these functions is O (M(k)log k) . In that, size k refers to the number of digits of precision at which the function is to be evaluated, M(k) stands for the complexity of the chosen multiplication algorithm. Therefore, the time complexity of this operation is O(2n ⋅ M(k) ⋅ log(k))
iii. execute noninvertible transformation this is the matrix multiplication operation between the orthonormal matrix M(2n × 2n) generated in step 2 and the biometric feature vector B(2n × 1).
if the schoolbook matrix multiplication algorithm is employed, the complexity of this step is O(2n × 2n × 1) = O(4n 2 ). However, M is an orthonormal matrix which all entries except its diagonal are zero, for each entry in the diagonal, we perform 2 multiplication operations and 1 addition operation. Therefore, the complexity of this operation is O(n ⋅ (2k 1.465 + k)). In that, size k refers to the number of digits of precision at which the function is to be evaluated, and the algorithm for multiplication operation is '3-way ToomCook multiplication' ii execute the decode process in this protocol, the linear error correcting code is used for decoding. for each element, it performs the nearest neighbour algorithm.
for each element, we perform a subtraction, an addition, a minimum, a maximum, an iteration with a comparison operation. We have 2n elements. Therefore, the complexity of this operation is O(2n(log(k) + k + Δ ⋅ log(k)))
iii. hash function O(2 n/2 )
